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Health and education are both components of human capital and contributors to human welfare. One
index of human welfare, which incorporates income, education and health, shows that Africa’s level of
‘human development’ is the lowest of any region in the world. In this paper we will frequently compare
Africa with South Asia. While Africa’s level of human development is lower than that of South Asia, its
per capita income is higher. Africa’s poor economic performance has been most marked in its growth
rate which has been half that of South Asia. As Africa has found since 1980, slow economic growth
severely limits the ability of governments and households to fund further investments in health and
education. Low investments in human capital may impinge on already low growth rates of income. Such
interrelations might be thought to imply a vicious circle of development, but this should not be overstated.
Poor countries have considerable discretion over how much to invest in health and education. Since
Independence, Africa has achieved a rapid growth of some aspects of human capital - particularly in
the expansion of education - despite starting from a low level of income. The expansion of the human
capital stock has not been matched by a commensurate rise in physical capital. The result has been low
growth of incomes and low returns to the educational investment.
This paper provides an overview of Africa’s achievements in the formation of human capital,  and
its impact on economic growth and welfare. Human capital, economic growth and welfare are closely
interrelated. Section 2 provides an assessment of Africa’s human development in the context of other
developing regions. Section 3 turns to the central issue of how to promote economic growth in Africa
and the role of human capital in that process. Section 4 presents evidence on the linkages between
education and health outcomes, while section 5 provides some concluding remarks.
2. Africa’s human development
The concept of development
The concept of human development centres around the notion that human welfare depends on various
dimensions, many of which are not well captured by conventional measures of economic income (see2 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Griffin and Knight, 1990; UNDP, 1990). Particular attention has been given to using measures of health
and education as welfare indicators in addition to GDP per capita. Education, good health and longevity
are intrinsically valuable outputs. In conventional measures of economic output, health and education’s
contribution is measured essentially by the costs of producing the outcomes, ie expenditures on schools
and medical facilities. Such a procedure identifies inputs rather than outputs. The valuation of both
health and education is difficult as both are goods with attributes different from most types of goods
produced in an economy. Whilst high incomes may be conducive to health, health cannot be directly
purchased like material goods and services. Health and education are often subsidised by the state and
in some countries education is compulsory for certain minimum length of times. Many, if not most,
health and education services are produced by the public sector. Governments play a direct part in
providing services very directly linked to human welfare.
In this paper, health outcomes are measured mainly through mortality statistics. Of these, life
expectancy at birth is perhaps the most comprehensive, depending as it does on the current age-
specific mortality rates for all age groups. Educational indicators are either stock or flow measures.
Stock measures of educational indicators include the literacy of the population, the average number of
years of education of the population and the extent of educational attainment by level. These measures
are appropriate for assessing the accumulated achievement of a country or for estimating the contribution
of education to economic performance. Flow measures are school enrolment ratios and measure
investment in the future capacities of the population.1
The UNDP has developed a composite indicator, the human development index (HDI),
which gives equal weight to three indicators: real GDP per capita (measured at purchasing power
parity in constant prices); life expectancy at birth; and educational attainment, measured by adult
literacy (two-thirds weight) and combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios (one-
third weight) (see UNDP, 1997, p122 for details). The index is valuable in extending the economic
concept of welfare, but for many purposes it is more useful to focus on the individual components
of the index than the index itself. Africa has performed very differently in each of the three
dimensions of the welfare and the dimensions are not independent.
The most recent UNDP Human Development Report shows that Africa has the lowest level
of human development of any region but its income per capita is higher than that of South Asia.2
In what follows, we often compare Africa with South Asia. This comparison provides a useful
benchmark, since South Asia is the region most similar to Africa in terms of income and overall
development. For example, it is instructive to consider why Africa has a lower HDI than South
Asia despite having higher income. The proximate cause is the relatively low life expectancy at
birth of Africans.
Comparison with other developing countries
Table 1 sets out the HDI and its components by region for 1994. Life expectancy in Africa is 53
years, compared to 61 in South Asia. Much of the lower life expectancy in Africa reflects higher
child mortality. Under-five mortality rates are 31% higher in Africa than in South Asia, and infant
mortality rates 19% higher. However, adult mortality is also much higher in Africa than elsewhere (see
World Bank, 1993). The explanation for the higher child mortality is probably not under-nutrition: the
proportions of low-birth weight infants and of underweight children under five are much lower in Africa
than in South Asia (see Table 47, UNDP, 1997). Instead, inferior health care is likely to be a factor.
Immunisation rates are much lower in Africa: only 60.5% of one year olds are fully immunised against
measles compared to 75% in South Asia; disparities in immunisation against tuberculosis are similar.Human Capital and Economic Development 3
Access to health services is lower in Africa: only 61% can reach a health facility by foot or local means
within one hour, compared to 82% in South Asia. This partly reflects the lower population density in
Africa. However, there are also less medical personnel. For the sample of countries for which information
is available, there are estimated to be 16,957 people per doctor in Africa compared to 3,704 in South
Asia. Another factor may be lack of access to “safe water”: only 56% of Africans have access to safe
water, compared to 76% of people in South Asia.
Africa has higher adult literacy rates than South Asia. This largely reflects the higher rates of
literacy among women in Africa compared to South Asia (43% compared to 34%; for men,
literacy rates are 64% and 62% respectively)3. Nonetheless, African men are still nearly 50%
more likely to be literate than African women. Africa’s superiority in literacy rates is likely to be
eroded over time: school enrolment rates are now lower in Africa than in any other region.
Combined primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratios average 46% in Africa, compared to
53% in South Asia. In most developing countries outside of Africa, male gross primary enrolment
ratios are close to 100% whilst in Africa they are 85% (for girls, gross primary enrolment ratios
are 73%). Box 1 discusses the issues raised by gender and human resource development.
These comparisons of Africa with other regions need to be seen in the context of trends in
income and human development since 1960.
Trends since 1960
The welfare of Africans rose in both the 1960s and 1970s, whether assessed solely by GDP per
capita or by the wider HDI. Taking a population weighted average for the 33 African countries
for whom data is available, GDP per capita in 1987 US dollars rose by around two fifths between
1960 and 1980. For the five South Asian countries for whom data is available, the rise in incomes was
smaller, amounting to less than one third of GDP per capita in 1960. After 1980, the situation radically
changed. Per capita incomes fell in Africa whilst in South Asia they had risen by a half by 1994. Since
1960, Africa has experienced more improvement in the composite human development index than in
GDP per capita. This is particularly marked since 1980, when the human development index continued
to rise despite economic decline. However, the rise in the HDI during this period was much slower than
in previous decades.
Table 1:  Development indicators for Africa compared with other regions in 1994
HDI GDP Life Adult Combined
per capita Expectancy Literacy educational
(PPP$) enrolment
Africa 0.429 1907 53.3 54.7 46
S.Asia 0.459 1686 61.4 49.7 53
E.Asia 0.652 3001 69 81.8 59
S.E.Asia & Pacific 0.672 3628 64.3 86.3 78
S.America & Caribbean 0.829 5873 69 86.2 69
E.Europe & CIS 0.760 4203 68.1 98.1 75
Industrial countries 0.911 15986 74.1 98.5 83
Source: UNDP (1997).4 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
There are gender differences in the allocation of human resources in Africa, although these may be
largely confined to education. Unlike parts of South Asia, there is no strong evidence of excess female
mortality or under-nutrition. However, African women are severely disadvantaged in terms of their
education. Only 43% of African women are literate compared to 64% of African men. Girls in African
are generally also less likely to be sent to school than boys. Gross primary school enrolments are
85% for boys, but only 73% for girls. A comparison of the gender differences in literacy and enrolment
shows that gender inequalities in education are falling over time. This is also apparent in data on
educational enrolments in the 1980s. What may be of increasing concern is the inferior academic
performance of girls in many African countries. This is seldom reported in official statistics, but has
been observed in countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Ethiopia, Kenya and Tanzania. There is no presumption
that girls are naturally less able: indeed, in countries such as the UK they outperform boys.
The low educational enrolment and achievement of African girls is of particular concern because
there is no strong evidence that the returns to education are lower for women. Most analyses of wages
find no systematic gender difference in the effects of education (see Table 6). It is possible that
education has higher returns in wage employment, so that the return to female education is lower
because of African women’s lower formal labour market participation. However, this is difficult to establish
because it requires a comparison with the non-wage returns education, some of which are hard to
quantify. Indeed, it may be that the non-wage returns are more likely sources of external benefits and
thus reasons for government support. A  study of agricultural productivity in Uganda found male and
female education equally beneficial (Appleton and Balihuta, 1996). Non-monetary returns to education
are often found to be higher for women. For example, maternal education is sometimes found to be
more important than paternal education for child health and child schooling. Female education is
increasingly emphasised as a way of reducing high fertility (for example, it was a major theme of the
1994 UN Conference on Population). This would help avoid the attendant risks of maternal and infant
mortality. It would allow parents to invest more in their smaller numbers of children. Not least, it would
help reduce the demands and constraints on women’s time. Dasgupta (1993) has estimated that in
high fertility regimes in Africa women spend around one third of their adult lives pregnant or breast-
feeding. By reducing fertility, female education is likely to lessen this severe constraint.
Although health in Africa is poor compared to elsewhere, it has improved greatly since 1960
when life expectancy on the continent was only 41 years. Until 1980, life expectancy in Africa was only
slightly less than in South Asia. Thereafter, however, trends in the two regions diverged sharply. Life
expectancy in Africa rose only 3.5 years from 1980-1994. By contrast, the rate of increase in longevity
accelerated in South Asia, rising from 51.5 to 61.3. This period also marked the greatest divergence in
economic performance between the two regions.
Africa’s high literacy rates compared to its income reflects the substantial expansion of
schooling in Africa since 1960. For the 27 African countries for whom we could obtain data,
gross primary school enrolment ratios rose from 38% in 1960 to 83% in 1980. As a consequence, the
adult literacy rate doubled between 1970 and 1994. These improvements in literacy are greater than
those in South Asia: during the same period, adult literacy in that region increased by only slightly more
than one half. Whilst adult literacy rates were lower in Africa than in South Asia in 1970, the reverse is
now true. However, in the area of enrolments Africa’s performance has been inferior to that of South
Asia. Combined educational enrolments in 1994 are only 3 points above their 1980 levels; in South
Asia, they had risen by 16 points. For the countries for whom we have data, gross primary school
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enrolments have on average fallen since 1980. Secondary school enrolment rates - and the proportion
of girls in primary school - have continued to rise but at a slower rate than before. Educational expenditures
per student have fallen in real terms (Sahn, 1992).
The result of these flow expenditures on the stock of human capital can be assessed using a
consistent set of data from 1965 to 1990. This we do in Table 2 and figure 1 which show the
percentage of the population over 15 with no education, and with some primary and with completed
primary education. The levels of completion at secondary and higher levels are also shown. The
figures for primary completers include those who completed education beyond primary. In 1965
both Africa and South Asia had 70 per cent of their population over 15 with no education. By
1990 this percentage had fallen further in Africa than in South Asia, to 46 per cent as compared
with 55 per cent. While Africa has out-performed South Asia in giving its population some
education, in terms of both primary and secondary completion rates its performance is inferior. In
1990 25 per cent of Africa’s population had completed primary school, while in South Asia it was
32 per cent. Africa has been relatively good in getting children into primary school, but bad at
inducing them to complete. This problem of drop-outs is a major problem for many African
countries: they spend large amounts of money teaching children who do not stay in school long
enough to learn much or to acquire any qualifications. Drop-outs may be partly due to the low
quality of schooling offered. Experimental evidence from Brazil suggests that investments in
higher quality education (such as extra provision of textbooks) may be self-funding if they lower
drop-out and repetition rates (Harbison and Hanushek, 1992). Africa also has low rates of secondary
school competion at 4 per cent, they are less than half that of South Asia, one-third that of South-
East Asia and less than 10 per cent of that of East Asia. The decline in enrolments rates and the
decline in the growth rate of educational coverage that can be observed in Africa may well reflect
the low growth rates of income the 1980s. In both 1965 and 1990 East Asia’s education level was
markedly higher than that for the other developing regions.
Variation within the continent
Although it can be useful to consider Africa as a whole, there is considerable variation in human
and economic development within the continent. Table 3 provides alternative rankings of African
countries based on their HDIs and GDP per capita. What is striking about the table is that the
same countries are in the top third of both lists. In many ways, these countries should be analysed
separately from the others on the continent. They include the North African countries bordering the
Mediterranean, South Africa and some smaller states. They are typically classified as having medium
(and in some cases, high) human development by UNDP and as being middle income countries by the
World Bank. The remaining two thirds of the countries are classified as having low human development
and (in the main) low incomes. However, the rankings of the poorest performing two-thirds of countries
differ substantially according to whether the HDI or GDP per capita is used. Some countries with very
low GDP per capita (Democratic Republic of Congo, Madagascar, Tanzania, Zambia) are in the middle
of the list ranked by the HDI. Others (Djibouti, Guinea, Senegal, Uganda) are in the middle third
ranked by income, but not by human development. This suggests that even given their incomes, countries
have some discretion over their degree of human development: some, such as Tanzania prior to 1980,
may promote health and education; others may neglect it. However, the variation also reflects the fact
that the flow of income can vary more in the short term than the stock of literate adults and the health
status of the population. Consequently, some countries (eg Democratic Republic of Congo) may have
high HDI figures relative to income because of marked economic decline rather than good social sector6 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Table 2: Changes in the Stock of Human Capital: 1965-1990
1965 1980 1990
Percentage of population over 15 with no education
Africa 70 56 46
S.Asia 71 67 55
East Asia 32 14 10
South East Asia and the Pacific 49 25 17
South America and the Caribbean 37 24 17
Industrial Countries 4 3 3
Percentage of population over 15 with some primary
Africa 17 25 28
S. Asia 16 8 13
East Asia 11 11 5
South East Asia and the Pacific 25 37 31
South America and the Caribbean 35 39 40
Industrial Countries 20 17 16
Percentage of population over 15 with primary completed
Africa 13 19 25
S. Asia 13 25 32
East Asia 58 74 85
South East Asia and the Pacific 26 39 52
South America and the Caribbean 28 37 43
Industrial Countries 76 80 81
Percentage of population over 15 with secondary completed
Africa 2 3 4
S. Asia 1 8 10
East Asia 14 35 50
South East Asia and the Pacific 4 10 12
South America and the Caribbean 6 11 16
Industrial Countries 20 41 39
Percentage of population over 15 with higher education completed
Africa 0.2 0.3 0.7
S.Asia 0.04 0.7 2.0
East Asia 2.0 4.4 5.9
South East Asia and the Pacific 0.8 1.7 3.1
South America and the Caribbean 0.9 2.0 3.7
Industrial Countries 4 7 11
Source: Barro and Lee (1994) data. The figures are weighted by the country populations. The sample is confined to those
 countries which have data for all three years.
policies. Others (eg Uganda since 1987) may benefit from economic recovery for some time before its
legacy of poor human development can be overcome. However, for further analysis it is useful to
disaggregate the components of the HDI. Although the components are strongly correlated across
African countries, there are some striking divergences in performance. Malawi has much better
educational indicators than one would expect from its low income, but lower life expectancy.Human Capital and Economic Development 7
Life expectancy varies markedly across the continent. Although it is typically around 50 years, in
eight countries it exceeds the world average of 63 years. Life expectancy in Africa is more strongly
correlated with GDP per capita than either adult literacy rates or gross educational enrolments. However,
some countries have very different life expectancy from what one would predict given their incomes.
The two least developed African countries (for whom there is data) - Rwanda and Sierra Leone - are
reported to have exceptionally low life expectancies at birth (23 and 34 respectively). Uganda also has
a much lower life expectancy than one would predict given its income. Although this partly reflects the
legacy of civil war and the onset of AIDS, much can be explained by its relatively low public spending
on health. Botswana also has a much lower life expectancy - at 52, it is 13 years lower than one would
predict given its income4. It could perhaps learn from nearby Lesotho, where life expectancy is nine
years higher than would be expected from its income alone.
Literacy rates vary enormously across the continent from less than 20% in Niger and Burkina
Faso to over 80% in Mauritius, the Seychelles, South Africa and Zimbabwe. School enrolment
statistics exhibit almost as much variation. Some countries have achieved almost universal primary
education; in others - notably the Sahelian countries - only a minority of children ever attend school.
Variations in income per capita can explain 59% of the variation in combined educational enrolments.
However, Southern African countries (with the exceptions of Angola, Botswana and Mozambique)
have noticeably higher enrolment rates than would be expected given their income, whilst many countries
bordering the Sahara desert tend to have lower than expected enrolment rates. Gender inequalities also
vary considerably across African countries. Inequalities are less marked in countries with high overall
rates of literacy and enrolments, but variation persists even controlling for that.
NO: Percentage of the population over 15 with no education
PRINC: Percentage of the population over 15 who failed to complete primary education
PRIC: Percentage of the population over 15 who have completed primary education
SECC: percentage of the population over 15 who have completed secondary education
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Table 3: Ranking African Countries by the Human Development Index and by Incomes UNDP (1997)
Ranking by HDI Ranking by GDP per capita
Rank Value Country Country Rank Value (PPP$)
1 0.845 Seychelles Mauritius 1 13172
2 0.831 Mauritius Seychelles 2 7891
3 0.801 Libya Libya 3 6125
4 0.748 Tunisia Algeria 4 5442
5 0.737 Algeria Botswana 5 5367
6 0.716 S.Africa Tunisia 6 5319
7 0.673 Botswana S.Africa 7 4291
8 0.614 Egypt Namibia 8 4027
9 0.582 Swaziland Egypt 9 3846
10 0.570 Namibia Morocco 10 3681
11 0.566 Morocco Gabon 11 3641
12 0.562 Gabon Swaziland 12 2821
13 0.547 Cape Verde Congo 13 2410
14 0.534 Sao Tome Zimbabwe 14 2196
15 0.513 Zimbabwe Cameroon 15 2120
16 0.500 Congo Ghana 16 1960
17 0.468 Ghana Cape Verde 17 1862
18 0.468 Cameroon Sao Tome 18 1704
19 0.463 Kenya Benin 19 1696
20 0.462 E.Guinea E.Guinea 20 1673
21 0.457 Lesotho Côte d’Ivoire 21 1668
22 0.412 Comoros Angola 22 1600
23 0.393 Nigeria Senegal 23 1596
24 0.381 Congo (DRC) Mauritania 24 1593
25 0.369 Zambia Kenya 25 1404
26 0.368 Côte d’Ivoire Uganda 26 1370
27 0.368 Benin Comoros 27 1366
28 0.365 Togo Nigeria 28 1351
29 0.357 Tanzania Djibouti 29 1270
30 0.355 Mauritania CAR 30 1130
31 0.355 CAR Lesotho 31 1109
32 0.350 Madagascar Togo 32 1109
33 0.335 Angola Guinea 33 1103
34 0.333 Sudan Sudan 34 1084
35 0.328 Uganda Mozambique 35 986
36 0.326 Senegal Zambia 36 962
37 0.320 Malawi Eritrea 37 960
38 0.319 Djibouti Gambia 38 939
39 0.291 Guinea Bissau Burkina Faso 39 796
40 0.288 Chad Guinea Bissau 40 793
41 0.281 Gambia Niger 41 787
42 0.281 Mozambique Chad 42 700
43 0.271 Guinea Burundi 43 698
44 0.269 Eritrea Madagascar 44 694
45 0.247 Burundi Malawi 45 694
46 0.244 Ethiopia Tanzania 46 656
47 0.229 Mali Sierra Leone 47 643
48 0.221 Burkina Faso Mali 48 543
49 0.206 Niger Congo (DRC) 49 429
50 0.187 Rwanda Ethiopia 50 427
51 0.176 Sierra Leone Rwanda 51 352Human Capital and Economic Development 9
The variation in human development within Africa is also marked in respect to trends since 1960.
Although on average life expectancy increased by 12 years in the continent, for some - eg the Maghreb
countries - the increase was around twenty years whilst in Uganda and Rwanda, life expectancy actually
fell. Burundi, Malawi, Zambia and Zimbabwe experienced only very modest improvements. All African
countries have made substantial gains in adult literacy since 1970. However, since 1980, trends in
educational enrolments have diverged considerably. In eleven of the forty-two countries for which there
is data, combined educational enrolments fell between 1980 and 1994, whilst in many others there
were strong gains.
3. The Effects of Human Capital on Economic Development
Human and Physical Capital
Human capital is a broad concept which identifies human characteristics which can be acquired
and which increase income. It is commonly taken to include peoples’ knowledge and skills, acquired
partly through education, but can also include their strength and vitality, which are dependent on
their health and nutrition. Human capital theory focuses on health and education as inputs to
economic production. This is in contrast to the concept of human development which views
health and education as intrinsically valuable outcomes to be placed alongside economic production
as measures of human welfare. In understanding the role of human capital as an input into
development it is necessary to consider the possible links between human capital, other forms of capital,
income and growth. While it is true for every country, for which there is data, that more educated
people earn more than less educated ones it does not follow that there is a simple relationship between
investing in people and countries becoming richer. Human and certain forms of physical capital may be
complementary. The problem in investing is to match skills with machines. It is not a question of either
investing in people or investing in machines, both are necessary. Even more important is the issue of
how much to invest in alternative forms of capital equipment and skilled labour. The answer to that
question is unlikely to be the same for all countries or to remain unchanged over time.
Rates of Return
By what criterion should an investment policy be judged? One important criterion is the rate of return
on investment. What is meant by the rate of return on the investment and why is such a figure important?
The rate of return on investment is comparable to the interest rate which must be paid on a loan.
Formally it is the rate of interest which ensures that the present value of the net benefits of an investment
are zero. Usually the more profitable is the investment, the more a given dollar raises future income, the
higher is the rate of return.5 If there is 1 dollar to invest it makes sense to invest it in the activity which
generates most income. Rates of return calculations simply tell us where the money goes furthest. Put
that way it may sound rather obvious that we should look at rates of return. It one sense it is, but the
problems arise because measuring rates of return is difficult.
Difficulties arise, firstly, because rates of return calculations inevitably involve assessments about
the future which is uncertain. Secondly, private and social rates of return may differ. From the point of
view of society as a whole it is the social rate of return which matters and that is particularly hard to
measure. Arguments which see the key to growth in investment in human capital are essentially arguing
that social rates of return on such investment are high. In particular they are arguing that such social10 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
returns are higher than private ones and that private markets are likely to invest too little in education.
The role of human and physical capital in growth
We begin by a consideration of the links by which investment may affect the growth of output. Both
physical and human capital directly impact on the productive capacity of an economy. However such
direct effects may not be the most important. More human capital may itself affect the rate of growth of
physical capital. If human and physical capital are complements then increasing human capital raises the
rate of return on physical capital. The underlying rate of technical progress in an economy, by which is
meant the increase in output due to factors other than measured inputs, may depend on how much
educated labour there is in the economy. Rates of return on investment must consider both the direct
and indirect effects of such investment. In assessing the effects of human capital on output we have both
macro and micro evidence. We present both in the following sections.
To place the problem in context it is useful to set out how the stock of both human and physical
capital in Africa compares with non-African countries. The comparative data set for human capital
available from Barro and Lee (1994) was used in Table 2 above. In Table 4 the figures for physical
capital are also presented. The data is drawn from the PENN world tables (Summers and Heston,
1991). The physical capital stock is a measure of the non-residential capital stock per worker.
Table 5 presents the growth rates, over the period 1965 to 1990, for income per worker and for
human and physical capital investment that can be computed from Tables 2 and 4. The growth rate for
the average of  primary and secondary school completion in Africa is half that for South Asia, as is the
growth rate of income. In Figure 2 the data from Table 5 is presented as a chart. The growth rate for
human capital is a weighted average of the growth rates for primary and secondary school completion
rates with the weights taken from 1980. While the averaged growth of education in Africa is lower than
both East Asia and South-East Asia the gap is small relative to the differences in the growth rate of
physical capital. It is at the secondary level where Africa’s growth rate is far below that of any other
developing region. At this level the gap between Africa and other developing regions has widened
substantially. There is evidence that it is education at the secondary level which is important for increasing
productivity in manufacturing. This poor performance may have serious implications for Africa’s ability
to compete in a global market place. Box 2 discusses some of the issues raised by globalisation and the
rise of new technologies.
The gap between Africa and the rest of the developing world also widened in the case of the
physical capital stock. Table 5 shows that the growth rate of the physical capital stock in Africa,
at 1 per cent per annum, was far below that of any other region. The comparable figures for other
regions are: 3.6 in South Asia, 7.9 in East Asia, 3.4 in South-East Asia, and 2.5 in South America.
In 1965 Africa’s physical capital stock was 34 per cent of that of East Asia; in 1990 it was 6 per cent.
While this is an extreme figure it dramatises the point that there is a widening gap between Africa and
other developing regions for physical capital and some dimensions of human capital.
There is research suggesting that the level of education as well as its growth rate may be
important:
“Given the initial level of per capita GDP, the growth rate is substantially positively related to
the starting amount of human capital. Thus poor countries tend to catch up with rich countries
if the poor countries have high human capital per person (in relation to their level of per capita
GDP), but not otherwise. As a related matter, countries with high human capital have low
fertility rates and high ratios of physical investment to GDP.” (Barro, 1991, p.437).Human Capital and Economic Development 11
Table 4: Physical Capital
Income Physical Capital Investment
Per Worker (a) Stock per Worker (b) Total (c)
Africa
1965 2,074 924 11
1990 2,702 1,141 8
South Asia
1965 1,822 852 13
1990 3,284 2,083 16
East Asia
1965 3,736 2,734 14
1990 17,290 19,844 31
South East Asia and the Pacific
1965 2,831 1,810 14
1990 5,726 4,278 22
South America and the Caribbean
1965 10,354 6,193 17
1990 12,565 11,467 14
Industrial Countries
1965 18,610 12,924 26
1990 30,361 34,914 25
Source: PENN 5.6 World Tables, Summers and Heston (1991). The regional figures are population weighted averages.
(a) Income per worker defintion: real GDP per worker at 1985 international prices.
(b) Physical capital per worker definition: Non-residential capital stock per worker at 1985 international prices.
(c) Total investment defintion: Percentage share of Investment  in GDP at 1985 international prices.
Table 5: Growth Rates, Income and Investment in Human and Physical Capital
Growth Rates (per cent per annum) 1965-1990
Income Physical Primary Secondary Combined
per Capital per School School Primary and
Worker Worker Completion Completion Secondary
Africa 1.1 0.8 2.6 2.8 2.6
South Asia 2.4 3.6 3.6 9.2 5.4
East Asia 6.1 7.9 1.5 5.1 3.2
South East Asia 2.8 3.4 2.8 4.4 3.2
and Pacific
South America and 0.8 2.5 1.7 3.9 2.4
the Caribbean
Industrial Countries 2.0 3.9 0.3 2.7 1.512 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Figure 2: Growth rates of income per worker physical and human capital
If this view is correct then it is the high levels of secondary and primary school completion in 1965,
rather than the changes since then, which are important for explaining the differences across the countries.
Why might the level of education be important? One effect of low levels of the human capital may be to
lower the ability of the economy to absorb information. Indeed
One of the great virtues of education, which has been shown in many micro studies, is that it
makes workers more flexible. It may be the case that levels matter as well as changes in those levels.
Even by 1990 the stock of human capital in Africa was far below its level in East Asia in 1965.
However, in 1965 Africa was marginally ahead of South Asia. While this region has not experienced
the dramatic growth of East Asia, it has outperformed Africa. It is clear from the above that while
human capital may have an important role to play this role will be vitiated unless policies ensure rapid
investment in other forms of capital. The problems associated with this were covered in the African
Development Report for last year.
Macroeconomic data allow the performance of African economies in the area of human and
physical capital to be seen in context. The data presented does not allow us to directly answer the
question  as to the rate of return on investment in education of different levels. We now turn to
micro data which allows that question to be addressed.Human Capital and Economic Development 13
Labour market conditions in African and elsewhere are likely to be influenced by two phenomena:
increasing globalization and the rise of new technology. One form of globalization is the increase in the
share of international trade from developing countries, particularly those in East Asia. The rise of new
technology is most visible in the case of information technology. Such technology is likely to induce a
shift in demand from unskilled to skilled labour. This will raise the return to acquiring higher levels of
human capital and may help to explain why the return to post-primary education is still sizable,
despite large increases in supply. However, other technologies may also be important for Africa: for
example, agriculture on the continent has yet to benefit from anything comparable to the Asian “Green
Revolution”. Studies of agricultural productivity in developing countries tend to find substantial returns
to education in “modernising” environments - where there are new technologies to adopt - but virtually
no returns in “traditional” environments (Lockheed, Jamison and Lau, 1980). This is consistent with
Schultz’s hypothesis that education allows agents to adjust to disequilibria (Schultz, 1975).
The impact of globalization is more ambiguous. Some, such as the World Bank, argue that a
liberalised Africa can follow the example of the East Asian countries and enjoy growth based on
manufactured exports. Manufacturing is likely to require more education than agriculture. Studies of
agricultural productivity typically find primary rather than secondary education to be important whilst
for non-agricultural wage employment in Africa post-primary is more important. Consequently, if
globalization promotes the development of African manufacturing, this should lead to a rise in the
return to education. However, Africa has benefited much less than other developing regions from the
increase in manufactured exports in the last two decades. Others, such as Adrian Wood at the
University of Sussex, argue that Africa’s much lower endowment of skilled labour relative to land gives
it a similar comparative advantage in agriculture rather than manufacturing (Wood and Berge, 1997). In
a simple Heckscher-Ohlin model where skills and land are the only factors, international trade would
reduce the return to education in a land-intensive region such as Africa. Wood argues that increases
in the skills of Africa’s workers by improved education is a pre-requisite to strong growth of manufactured
Rates of Return on Educational Investment from Micro Studies
The conventional wisdom is that there is a high rate of return on primary schooling. This view is
based largely on surveys of rate of return studies by Psacharopoulos. In the most recent of these
surveys, (Psacharopoulos, 1994), the social rate of return on primary education in sub-Saharan Africa
was estimated to be 24 per cent, for secondary education it was 18 and for higher education 11 per
cent. Private returns were higher at 41%, 27% and 28% respectively. However, this view has been
persuasively challenged by Bennell (1996). Bennell makes two points. First,  the original sources do
not support Psacharopoulos’s estimates. Second, that in so far as it ever was true, “the conventional
rate of return on education patterns almost certainly do not prevail in sub-Saharan Africa under
current labour market conditions” (p.195). That this second objection is possibly correct is suggested
by the survey of the Mincerian returns to education in sub-Saharan Africa in Appleton, Hoddinott and
Mackinnon (1996) reproduced as Table 6. The average (private) returns to education suggested by
their survey are substantially below those presented in Psacharopoulos (1994). This is true for both
primary and post-primary schooling, although the latter still appears to have substantial returns.
More recent evidence is available. Data has been collected over three years for a panel of firms
within the manufacturing sectors of the Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, Zambia and Zimbabwe over the
Box 2: Globalization, new technology and the return to human capital14 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
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period 1992-1995, Bigsten et al (1997). The sectors within the manufacturing sector were chosen so
as to be as similar as possible across the countries. At the same time as the firms were surveyed a
parallel interview was carried out for a representative sample of the workers in the enterprises.
In Table 7 the data is presented for the earnings for each educational category by country in US
dollars. At the university level there is a fairly  narrow range for three of the countries, Cameroon,
Zambia and Zimbabwe, which widens steadily as the education level falls. For all educational levels
wages in Ghana are substantially below the other countries. A university completer in Ghana earns less
than a primary school completer in Cameroon. In broad terms we observe a wide spectrum of earnings
with workers in Ghana at the bottom. In Ghana an employee who has completed primary school earns
US$47, which is well below wage levels for rural workers in Chinese enterprises, Knight, Song and
Huaibin (1997). The differential across countries is not identical for all the educational categories. The
table also presents Mincerian rates of return to education (Mincer, 1974). The assumption which underlies
the Mincerian interpretation is that, for each educational level, the only costs are opportunity costs: the
wages forgone whilst acquiring education. The measure omits pecuniary costs (including those born by
the government) and so will tend to over-estimate the returns, particularly at the university level. However,
at the primary level, the assumption that wages are forgone by attending school may be incorrect and
cause the returns to be under-estimated. As with the estimates in Table 6, the rates of return to education
rise with the level of education. The rates of return on university education are very much larger than
those at lower levels. As Figure 3 shows the increments in earnings from completing either primary or
secondary are dwarfed by the rises that accrue to those with university education. These high earnings
may partly reflect the ability of those with higher qualifications to work abroad, a problem which has
been identified as a brain drain, see Box 3.
There are several reasons why the returns to education presented in Table 7 may be based on
coefficients that are biased. The years of schooling are measured assuming no repetition (see
Behrman and Deolalikar, 1991). Biases may also arise as we have not allowed for selectivity.
Those who work in the manufacturing sector are highly atypical. Secondly, such educational
measures cannot distinguish between signalling and credentionalism as alternatives to the human capital
interpretation. The signalling explanation for the findings suggests that education is associated with
higher incomes because those with higher education have more ability. Education signals ability. The
credentalist view is that institutional wage structures reward those with qualifications: it is qualifications
that are rewarded rather than the skills the qualifications are meant to reflect. Thirdly, it is known that
parental background can play an important role in educational choice. The sample is limited to those in
manufacturing, and it was not possible to use variables measuring ability or information on parental
background. To see if these factors indicate that the rates of return presented in Table 7 are too high it
is necessary to assess the importance of these problems.
A recent study examining some of these issues for Ghana is Glewwe (1996). The question that
needs to be posed is as follows: if no controls are included for cognitive skills or parental background,
is there evidence of significant bias in the education variable? Glewwe provides evidence that there may
be some upward bias. If selectivity is allowed for in the private sector earnings function then the coefficient
on years of schooling becomes insignificant. Glewwe then calculates the rate of return on education
based on the measures of cognitive skills available for his data set. He finds a figures of 4 per cent, for
an individual aged 25, which compares with a rate of return of 7 per cent from the earning function. If
a years of education measure is used in the earnings function for the data in Table 7 the return to
education for Ghana is 6 per cent. Thus the evidence from Glewwe (1996) suggests there may be some
bias in an upward direction.16 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Figure 3:  Monthly earnings in five African countries by education in US$, 1992-1995
Four studies which have information on parental background are Behrman and Wolfe (1983),
Lam and Schoeni (1993), Heckman and Hotz (1986) and Kingdon (1997). The conclusion, which is
uniform across the studies is that the inclusion of parental background reduces the returns to schooling
by about 20 per cent. Again this is evidence that the estimates presented in Table 7 may be upwardly
biased. A recent study which uses a panel data set of twins to estimate the returns to school quality,
Behrman, Rosenzweig and Taubman (1996) finds that  controlling for family background does affect
the assessment of the returns from school quality but has only very marginal effects on the returns to
schooling coefficient. A study which has very detailed information on cognitive skills and parental
background is that of Knight and Sabot (1990). Their study uses comparative data drawn from workers
in the manufacturing sectors of Kenya and Tanzania. They argue that the returns of education variable
is picking up human capital formation. While signalling may play some role, it is not the primary reason
years of education determines earnings.
The conclusion we would draw is that the evidence suggests that the education variable may
overstate the returns to human capital, but not by very much, and that the major influence of years of
education on earnings is through its effects of cognitive skills and not, as the signalling explanation wouldHuman Capital and Economic Development 17
imply, indirectly through signalling ability. Even if the biases are more significant that the empirical evidence
currently suggests,  it is not clear that they would explain, or mitigate, the non-linearity in the returns to
education. The conclusion, that the returns to education are modest, is one common to other studies.
Freeman (1986, p.377) notes that “every study also finds that, by itself, years of schooling explains a
relatively small part of the variance of log earnings, say 3-5 percent at most”.
In Table 7 the pattern is similar across all the countries, the rate of return falls with the level of
education. What might account for this pattern? The returns to primary and secondary school completers
obtain mainly through gaining employment in the formal sector. In the context of Africa such jobs have
declined in the last decade. This decline has occurred in the context of the rapid expansion of education
and very low growth rates of physical capital. In such a context low rates of return on education might
be expected.
“There has been an amazing brain drain from Africa. The rest of the world has benefited from this, but
it has not been to the benefit of Africa” (Jaycox, 1993, p.73)
Data on the extent of the flight of the most educated Africans from the continent is provided by
census data from industrialised countries. In the UK, there are 134,500 Africans: 14,500 have first
degrees and 4,600 have advanced degrees. Of all the ethnic minorities in the UK, Africans the largest
percentage with recognized educational qualifications (Owen, 1993). More generally, it has been
estimated that “about 100,000 foreign experts work in Africa, whilst some 100,000 skilled Africans
work in Europe and North America” (Willams, 1994) These skilled Africans are typically doctors,
research scientists and university teachers. Such an exchange of labour has positive aspects, but in
general the emigration of many of highly educated from Africa is of concern given the scarcity of such
people in the continent. Although governments pay for most of the cost of higher education, the
emigration of graduates means that their countries do not benefit from these investments. Often these
graduates are replaced by hiring in expatriates at great cost (typically, higher wages are necessary to
induce people to work in foreign countries).
Most of the “brain drain” occurs when Africans leave to study abroad. Consequently, improving
higher education in Africa would go someway to reducing the problem (it would also make leading
scholars less likely to emigrate). Increasing the extent of cost recovery in higher education would help
pay for such improvements and would also reduce one major reason for being concerned about the
“brain drain” (namely, that Africans are paying for the education of people who will work in other
countries). Introducing a system of “bonding” students, so that they would have to pay back the cost
of their studies if they emigrate might be an alternative or additional solution (Bhagwati and Partington,
1976). Many of the most internationally mobile professionals work in occupations where the state is
the main employer (eg medicine, research, higher education) Such jobs may often be underpaid.
Given the willingness of many industrialised countries to accept highly skilled Africans as immigrants,
such workers are effectively in an international labour market and can command international rates of
pay. Even if they do not emigrate and remain in government employment, underpaid professionals may
put their energies into consultancy work for international agencies or establish their own businesses,
at the expense of their main employers. African governments may be unwilling to pay higher rates
because they cannot afford commensurate increases for less skilled workers. However, such differentials
may be necessary if top African professionals are to stay in the continent and work efficiently for the
government.
Box 3: Human capital flight from Africa18 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Table 7: Manufacturing workers’ earnings (monthly in US$) by Education
Cameroon Ghana Kenya Zambia Zimbabwe
Completed University
Earnings 659 175 358 547 569
Education (years) 19 19 16 16 16
Rate of return 38 29 43 65 37
No. of observations 130 40 59 107 33
Completed Secondary
Earnings 312 64 102 188 176
Education (years) 15.5 14.6 11.5 12.8 11.2
Rate of return  4.4 8.2 3.4 7.4 6.1
No. Of observations 723 524 1,215 899 651
Completed Primary
Earnings 203 47 72 84 117
Education (years) 7.3 10.1 8 8.7 8
Rate of return 3 2.8 2.4 4.9 2
No. of observations 674 1,838 1,384 1,244 959
Incomplete primary
Earnings 154 33 65 55 112
Education (years) 2.1 na 4.2 3.6 4.4
No. of observations 128 155 475 221 317
All
Earnings 283 52 88 139 143
Formal Education 11.2 10.6 8.9 10.0 8.6
No. of observations 1655 2557 3133 2471 1960
Source: Bigsten et al (1997). In the case of Ghana the number of years attended school for those who did not
complete primary education is not available. Rates of return are Mincerian, calculated as percentage per year of schooling.
Productivity effects of ill health and malnutrition
Less research has been done on the returns to health and nutrition than on the returns to education.
This is partly because the non-monetary aspects of these returns - greater longevity, reduced suffering
and absence of disability - are arguably more central than in the case of education. Attempts have been
made to put financial values on these non-monetary outcomes, but the judgements involved are complex
and subject to considerable controversy. More promising are attempts to assess the cost-effectiveness
of various interventions in improving particular health indicators (see, for example, the analysis of cost-
effectiveness in terms of “disability life years” in the World Development Report, 1993). Here we
consider some of the direct economic costs of ill-health in terms of reduced labour productivity. Possible
indirect effects, in terms of lower investment in the quality of future labour, will be considered next.
Labour supply is adversely affected by illness in various ways. Most directly, days of work are
lost when workers fall ill. Table 8  reports estimates of the cost of this using data from the Living
Standards Measurement Surveys. On average, adult workers in the three African countries were ill for
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Table 8:  Expected income loss due to illness in the last 30 days, adult workers aged 20-59
Country Expected days ill Expected work days absent Expected income loss
(% of normal earnings)
Africa:
Côte d’Ivoire 2.7 1.3 4.6
Ghana 3.5 1.4 11.0
Mauritania 2.2 1.6 5.2
Source:  Table drawn from King and Wang (p23, 1995).
losses arising from absence due to illness range from around 5% in Côte d’Ivoire and Mauritania, to
over 10% in Ghana. These losses are substantially higher than in the American countries for whom
comparable figures are available.
These figures are probably underestimates, since they exclude a number of other important effects
of ill-health. Often people may continue to work when ill, but with lower productivity. Healthy workers
are likely to have to stop work to care for sick household members (particularly children). Invalidity
and premature death may also substantially reduce labour supply. Low life expectancy and the risk of
serious illness may reduce incentives to undertake longer term investments which might raise productivity.
There has been a large literature on the effects of nutritional status on labour productivity and
wages. Behrman (1993) provides a recent review of the literature on  two types of evidence. The first
type of evidence is provided by data from socio-economic surveys which enable the association between
measures of nutrition and worker productivity (or wages) to be investigated. One African study, Strauss
(1986), studied the link between calorie intake and agricultural labour productivity in Sierra Leone.
Care was taken to control for the simultaneity of the relationship6. A one standard deviation increase in
calories per equivalent adult was predicted to raise farm output by 20%, compared to the 33% impact
of a one standard deviation in labour input. In a study of farm productivity in Ethiopia, Croppenstedt
and Muller (1997), find a one standard deviation increase in the household head’s weight-for-height
would increase output by 27%. The second kind of evidence is experimental: different groups of workers
are given different kinds of nutritional supplement. One experiment gave Kenyan construction workers
supplements of 1,000 calories per day. Since less food was consumed at home, this translated into an
increase of 500 calories per day (a low-calorie supplement of 200 calories per day was almost completely
offset by reduced consumption at home). Workers on the high-calorie supplement increased their
productivity by 12.5% per day, a large increase (implying an output elasticity of 0.5 compared with the
0.33 estimated for Sierra Leone)7.
4. The Indirect Effects of Investment in Human Capital
In sections 2 and 3 education and health were treated as separate components of human capital.
Here the possible linkages between them are discussed. Expenditures on education may affect health
and parental education may benefit children. Health expenditures may themselves affect the value of
education. These links are important for understanding the potential range of benefits which accrue to
expenditures on human capital.20 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Effects of health on child schooling and cognitive development
Ill-health and poor nutrition may have indirect effects on labour productivity by adversely affecting
schooling. Illness often leads to absence from school and nutritional deficiencies can reduce the ability
to learn. Some experimental studies imply substantial benefits from particular interventions. One African
example found positive effects of deworming medication on school attendance and achievement in
Kenya (Jamison and Leslie, 1990). Cross-sectional evidence is more difficult to interpret but still
suggestive. In Ghana, one econometric study attributed delayed primary school enrolment to low height-
for-age (Glewwe and Jacoby, 1995). A study of Kenya found no effect of height-for-age on children’s
school performance (Sigman, Newman, Jansen and Bwibo, 1989). However, calorie intake did affect
school performance by affecting time off task for girls. Ill-health inhibits school attendance; this may be
true of the ill-health of other household members as well as morbidity of the pupil herself. Adult mortality
- such as that from AIDS - is likely to pose grave threats to the schooling of bereaved children (Ainsworth
and Koda, 1993). In Box 3 the general issues raised by poverty and human resources are discussed.
Effects of education upon health and nutrition
One indirect effect of expenditure on education may be its effects on health. Within developing
countries, the children of educated parents face lower risks of premature death. This is apparent from
analysis of both the World Fertility Surveys and the subsequent Demographic and Health Surveys
(Hobcraft, 1993). Parental education is also associated with better child anthropometric status (weight
and height), although the association is less marked than that with mortality. However, in socio-economic
surveys, educated parents are often more likely to report that their children have been ill. This suggests
that educated parents are better at recognising medical problems in their children.
Part of the association between parental education and child mortality may work via household
income. However, the independent impact of education in models which carefully control for
income shows this cannot be the only transmission mechanism. Indeed, many studies have found
education to have a stronger direct effect on child health than income.8 The direct effect of education
may be informational. In Uganda, recent work found educated mothers to be better informed about
various diseases and that such information was strongly associated with lower child mortality (Mackinnon,
1995). Similarly, in Morocco, mothers’ education appears to improve child anthropometric status by
providing cognitive skills which increase knowledge about health (Glewwe, 1997). In Côte d’Ivoire
and Kenya, educated mothers are more likely to send sick children for treatment (Appleton, 1992).
Effects of education upon fertility
Whether and how government policy should affect fertility is a controversial ethical issue. However,
the UN International Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in September 1994 highlighted
the importance of enhancing female education as part of a successful population policy. More educated
women commonly tend to have smaller families, although this is less marked in Africa than elsewhere.
Perhaps the best evidence on the relationship between fertility and female education in Africa is that
provided by the Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS) carried out in the late 1980s. Table 9 provides
descriptive statistics on the differentials by education in total fertility rates of women aged 15-49 in
fourteen African countries. Women with primary education tend to have fewer children in most countries,
but the relationship is weak. By contrast, women with post-primary education have markedly fewer
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Nyamete, 1995)9. In half of the countries, there was no significant association between primary education
and fertility after controlling for income, age and a few other variables. For the other half of the countries,
there was a significant negative relationship but it was less strong than with secondary schooling. By
contrast, there was a universally negative relationship between fertility and female secondary schooling.
The effects of higher secondary schooling (11 years of schooling or more) were 2-4 as large as those of
lower secondary schooling. Husbands’ education also had a negative effect on fertility where it was
significant, although the effect was weaker than that of wives’ education. Education appears to reduce
fertility more in the DHS data than in the earlier World Fertility Surveys carried out in the late 1970s
(see UN, 1987). Although this may partly be accounted for by methodological differences in the data
analysis, this seems to reflect a genuine change over time. In particular, amongst women in the older
cohort (aged 35 and over) of the DHS, schooling of less than eleven years was seldom associated with
lower fertility.
The associations between female education and fertility are likely to be, at least partly, causal.
Educated women may be able to obtain higher wages, increasing the opportunity cost of time spent
rearing children. They may also have a preference for more educated children, making it more expensive
to have large families. Education may also change knowledge of and attitudes towards the use of
modern contraception. However, there is a simultaneity between female education and fertility. In most
countries, child-bearing and school attendance are incompatible, so girls face a choice between staying
on at school and marrying young. This may partly explain why higher secondary schooling has such a
large impact on fertility, since the age of students often coincides with the typical age at marriage in
many African countries.
Table 9:  Total fertility rates for women aged 15-49 by education
Education Completed More than
Year None Primarya Primary Primary
Tanzania 1991-92 6.5 6.4b 6.0 4.2
Uganda 1988-89 7.7 7.2b 7.3 6.7/5.1c
Burundi 1987 6.8 7.2   - 5.5
Mali 1987 6.8 6.2   - n.a.
Niger 1992 7.5 6.3d   -   -
Nigeria 1990 6.5 7.2b 5.6 5.1/4.2c
Kenya 1993 6.0 6.2b 5.0 4.0
Ghana 1993 6.7 6.1  - 4.7/2.9c
Togo 1988 6.8 5.7  - 4.5
Zambia 1992 7.1 6.8  - 4.9
Zimbabwe 1988 7.0 6.0  - 3.8
Senegal 1992-93 6.5 5.7  - 3.8
Cameroon 1991 6.2 6.4  - 4.5
Botswana 1988 6.0 5.2b 4.6 3.3
Source: DHS country reports, as presented in Ainsworth, Beegle and Nyamete (1996).
n.a. Not applicable
- Not reported.
a. Unless otherwise noted, primary refers to any primary schooling, including completed primary.
b. Incomplete primary.
c. First figure is for lower secondary school; second for upper secondary school.
d. Any schooling (primary or more).22 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Poverty can prevent households from making high return investments in the human capital of their
children. The poor may not be able to spare their children - particularly their girls - from household work
in order to go to school. A study of gender differences in performance in the primary-leaving examination
in the Cote d’Ivoire found that the difference arose due to the under-performance of girls from poor
households. This may reflect the demands on the time of girls in poor households. In their last two
years of primary school, girls from the poorest 25% of households reported spending 16 hours a week
in school and 15 hours on housework; in the most affluent 25% of households, the figures were 27
hours and 7 hours respectively (Appleton, 1995a). Poor households may also not be able to afford the
monetary costs of health care and education. These costs may help explain why the benefits of post-
primary schooling accrue mainly to the non-poor. A beneficiary assessment of social sector spending
in Tanzania found the poorest and most affluent quintiles received 19% and 18% respectively of
expenditure on primary schooling; but for secondary schooling, the poorest  received only 8% and the
most affluent received 36%. All university expenditure was estimated to accrue to the richest 20% of
the population (World Bank, 1995). However, non-monetary factors are also important: lack of parental
education is often found to be more critical than a lack of income per se in determining child health,
performance at school and eligibility for post-primary education.
Household surveys provide useful evidence on the distribution of investments in human capital. For
example, survey data for Cote d’Ivoire in 1985 showed net primary school enrolment rates for boys to
be 32% amongst the poorest 10% of the population but 66% amongst the non-poor (defined as the top
70% of the population. For girls, the corresponding figures were 22% and 54%. Interestingly, girls from
poor households appear to have suffered more from the country’s economic decline in the 1980s: by
1988, net primary school enrolments for girls in very poor households had declined to 17% whilst
amongst the non-poor they had risen to 57%. Male primary school enrolments rose in non-poor
households and remained constant in very poor ones. Poverty was also strongly correlated with use of
curative and preventive health care, although here gender differences were less marked. In 1985, 31%
of very poor males consulted a doctor or nurse when sick; amongst the non-poor the figure was 51%
(Grootaert, 1994). By 1988, the inequalities had widened, with the corresponding proportions being
19% and 53%.
Poverty profiles of African countries invariably find rates of poverty decline sharply with the education
of the household head. For example, in Nigeria in 1992, 39.5% of people in households with uneducated
heads were poor; for those living in households with secondary school educated heads, the poverty
rate was only 23% (World Bank, 1996). Education reduces poverty partly by giving access to high
return formal sector employment and to higher wages within such employment. However, there is
evidence that education and nutrition also raise productivity in farm and non-farm self-employment,
activities in which the poor are concentrated.
Effects of education upon child schooling and cognitive development
Children are typically more likely to go to school if their parents are educated. They also tend to
perform better in school and in some cases may earn higher incomes in adulthood. For example, a
study of Kenya and Tanzania compared the probability of manufacturing workers having completed
lower secondary schooling as a function of the education of their parents. In Kenya those entering
school around 1960 were predicted to have a 21% chance of completing lower secondary if both their
parents were uneducated and an 83% chance if one of their parent had at least secondary education
and the other at least primary education. The figures were similar Tanzania. Since most secondary
schools at that time were state schools, where access was rationed by performance in the primary-
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leaving examination, these figures also suggest large differentials in academic performance by parental
education. More recent research drawing upon data from Kenya in 1993, also found a large differential
in performance on the primary-leaving examination - around half of which was explained by the different
local neighbourhoods and primary schools which children from different educational backgrounds
attended (Appleton, 1995b).
These results suggest that educating one generation will have favourable effects both on the cognitive
skills and the health of the next. They also imply that there may be a “ratchet effect” to educational
expansions: parents may be reluctant to see their children obtaining less education than they received.
Investments in health also have long-term dynamic intergenerational effects, which are partly biological.
Consequently, a mother’s nutrition affects the health not only of her children, but of her daughter’s
children. Compared to much physical capital, human capital is long-lived and more irreversible: if people
are not given adequate nutrition, health care and education in childhood, this is will have consequences
that cannot be remedied in adulthood. For these reasons, investments in human capital cannot be put
off until economic conditions are better.
Conclusion
Africa has made large strides in raising literacy and school enrolments and improving health.
However, in the case of both education and health these gains are lower than those in other developing
countries. The percentage of the population over 15 which had completed primary school in 1990 was
25 per cent in Africa as compared with 32 per cent in South Asia. At the secondary level the gap is
larger with only 4 per cent of the population over 15 having completed secondary school. The comparable
figure for South Asia is 10 per cent, for East Asia it is 50 per cent. Life expectancy on the continent is
now 8 years below that in South Asia.  Within the overall average for Africa there is great diversity. The
health and education of people in some African countries is far lower than would be expected from their
income. The nature and extent of this diversity is examined.
Human capital is only one factor in accounting for differences in growth rates across countries.
While low starting levels of human capital may have hindered Africa’s economic growth, its poor
performance cannot be attributed to a lack of subsequent investment in human capital. A more important
proximate cause is the low level of investment in physical capital. Low rates of investment in physical
capital have implications for the rates of return on human capital, particularly education. The conventional
wisdom that the rates of return to education are very high is shown not to have held in the context of
many African labour markets in the 1980s and 1990s. If human and physical capital are complements
then the policy problem is enabling them both to grow rapidly. Returns to human capital investment
depend on the success of policies in promoting the growth of physical capital. There is evidence from
micro studies that the income returns to education reflect the effects of education in raising productivity.
These effects have been observed for  both industry and agriculture. For industry it is the secondary
level which is important while for agriculture it is primary education. Less research has been done on the
productivity effects of health and nutrition in Africa. The limited evidence is consistent with conclusions
from other developing countries that these effects may be substantial. The role of human capital in
Africa’s economic development is complex. Inadequate investment in education and health are clearly
not the only cause of Africa’s economic difficulties. However, the poor health and education of Africa’s
workers is one factor explaining her  low income. Government investment in the social sectors is likely
to be economically productive and indeed is likely to bring more direct benefits to the people than many
other forms of government expenditure.24 Simon Appleton and Francis Teal
Government investment in both education and health may be particularly important as there are
indirect benefits of such investments which individuals may not allow for in their investment decisions.
Social rates of return may substantially exceed private rates.
Child illness and malnutrition inhibit attendance and performance in school. There are long term
effects of educating one generation on the welfare of their future children. Africa’s earlier investments in
schooling mean that many more African parents are educated. This is lowering child mortality, reducing
the number of births and helping to maintain school enrolments despite falling incomes. The long-term
intergenerational effects of health and education are an important reason for promoting social sector
investments despite tight current fiscal constraints. To this should be added the irreversible effects of
failing to make such investments. Once a generation of children are exposed to life without adequate
health care, nutrition or schooling, there is little that can be done during their adulthood to reverse the
damage. Perhaps the main conclusion of this paper is paradoxical. Despite the many and complex
interlinkages between human capital and economic development, the policy debate might benefit from
a greater delinking of the two. The optimists are wrong to believe that investing in human capital will be
sufficient for growth. The pessimists are equally wrong to argue that investments in health and education
must wait for growth.Human Capital and Economic Development 25
Notes and References
1. Note that indicators of educational attainment tell us little about the quality of education received and the extent
of the skills retained by individuals. Literacy statistics do provide some basic information, but are limited both
because of their binary nature and the fact that they are often self-reported. Rates of enrolment at educational
institutions tell us nothing about what students learn at these institutions.
2 . Unless stated otherwise, the data used in this section comes from UNDP (1997). The core sample of African
countries used is fifty-one, the major exclusions - due to lack of data - are Liberia and Somalia. The South
Asia statistics exclude Afghanistan. For some particular statistics, information is only available for a subset.
Most statistics refer to the early 1990s, typically 1994. Where aggregates are given for Africa, these are
population weighted. For conciseness, not all statistics referred to in the text are provided in the tables -
additional figures are available from the authors upon request.
3. Female life expectancy relative to male life expectancy is also higher in Africa than in South Asia. Since females
can be expected to live longer on biological grounds, it is still possible that there is “excess female mortality” in
Africa (see the debate between Klasen, 1996, and Svedberg, 1996). Nonetheless, even if there is, it is not on the
scale of the excess female mortality observed in South Asia.
4. Where predictions of a variable are made on the basis of income, they are based on a linear regression of the
variable on GDP per capita (and its square, if statistically significant). The regressions are purely descriptive,
making no allowance for simultaneity or non-income determinants.
5. There are conditions under which the rate of return gives incorrect signals for the best investment, see Dinwiddy
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